The Evolution of the British Welfare State

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The 1948 National Health Act, aimed at achieving that very objective, and established for the first time a national minimum. Strictly speaking, the class mobilization thesis should be seen not as a mere variation but as a distinctive theory that has its root in the neo-Marxist tradition because, unlike the logic of capitalism, which sees welfare spending as a means for capital to maintain its dominant position, it views welfare spending as a reflection of the political power gained by workers. It pays attention to the relative power of the “subordinate” class and regards variations in their power as being key in explaining variation in welfare state development. Ocr tesseract 4.1.1 Ocr_detected_lang en Ocr_detected_lang_conf 1.0000 Ocr_detected_script Latin Ocr_detected_script_conf 1.0000 Ocr_module_version 0.0.10 Ocr_parameters -l eng Old_pallet IA-WL-0000133 Openlibrary_edition urn:lcp:evolutionofbriti0004fras:lcpdf:38d9b24e-1b18-422c-9a11-f72fe9b6069a Foldoutcount 0 Grant_report Arcadia #4281 Identifier evolutionofbriti0004fras Identifier-ark ark:/13960/t3mx2dw2v Invoice 2089 Isbn 9780230224650

Evolved from the state-centered approach that criticizes the demand-driven approaches (e.g., social forces and conflict) involving passive and defensive actions from a government (Nordlinger 1981; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Evans et al. 1985; Skocpol 1985; Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Ashford 1986; Almond 1988; Thelen and Steinmo 1992), scholars inspired by the institutional perspective began to stress the relationship between institutions and individual behavior and the distinctive political outcomes produced by this relationship (Steinmo et al. 1992; Hall and Taylor 1996). For them, “political life is characterized, not simply by a struggle over the allocation of resources, but also periodically by strife and uncertainty about the rules of the game within which this allocative process is carried out” (Krasner 1984:225). Institutions establish the rules of the game, have long-term effects, foster stability by resisting dramatic change, and condition the opportunities and incentives for political action or inaction. They are thereby seen as intervening or intermediate variables that shape behavior and political outcomes (Krasner 1984; Gorges 2001). Taking the cue from Heclo’s ( 1974) illuminating parallels between the British and Swedish systems, where he stressed the critical importance of the inheritance of past policies in determining what is feasible at any given time, those inspired by this tradition have shifted the study of social policy away from a predominantly sociological perspective and into the realm of political science.The identification of these clusters itself was the key contribution of his work. Yet what is more compelling is his explanation for the reasons why particular nations developed their welfare provision along one particular path or another. He rejects the conception of an evolutionary development of social reform. For him, it is the interaction of three most important factors over time that produced a distinctive welfare state regime, much of which depended on the outcome of the power constellations during the formative phase of welfare states. Each of his three highly diverse regime types is organized around its own discrete logic of organization, stratification, and societal integration, and is given an “account that is much more nuanced, much more attentive to particularities and context – in a word, much more historical – than the older, unilinear, social scientific approach […] by taking a more contextualized and particularized approach to the development of social policy” (Baldwin 1992:703). For Esping-Andersen ( 1990:4), and Baldwin ( 1990:299) too for that matter, “politics not only matters, but is decisive.”

This neo-Marxist understanding of welfare state development is not uniform, however: there are at least three distinctive theoretical propositions within it. To start with, instrumentalists heavily criticize the core claim of pluralists that the state plays the role of neutral broker in mediating conflicts between various interests. Rather, for them, the state plays an instrumental role only to serve the capitalist’s interests. Miliband argues that “the intervention of the state is always and necessarily partisan: as a class state, it always intervenes for the purpose of maintaining the existing system of domination, even where it intervenes to mitigate the harness of that system of domination” ( 1977:91). It is the capitalist who monopolizes economic organizations, exercises strong influence on political organizations, and determines social provision depending on the necessity for capital accumulation. Hence welfare reforms basically function as a form of social control rather than of social investment (Piven and Cloward 1971; Ginsburg 1979; Miliband 1991). Neither the basic structure of capitalist society nor the status, income, and political power of those who have already been influential are affected by social policy.The overseers were meant to provide work for the able-bodied poor. Anyone who refused to work was whipped and, after 1607, they could be placed in a house of correction. Pauper’s children were sent to local employers to be apprentices. An enquiry was established in 1941 to propose how best to tidy up state welfare. Beveridge seized the opportunity, rewrote the script, and then redesigned the contours of British welfare. The publication of his report was fortuitously delayed. When it was produced in November 1942 it followed hard on the heels of the Allies' first major victory of World War Two. Implementing Beveridge was immediately seen as part of winning the peace. In comparison, the third variation puts more emphasis on political class struggle. Instead of stressing the capitalist’s long-term or short-term interests, the development of the welfare state is interpreted as the outcome of a long political struggle between the working class and the capitalist and its allies. Known as the “power resources” approach, the fundamental power resources in advanced industrial societies are assumed to be divided and derive from labor control through the market mechanism and from political power through the capacity for collective action (Korpi 1989). Therefore, this working-class mobilization thesis explains that the development of the welfare state is dependent upon the strength of the labor movement and its political ability to implement collective welfare provisions through electoral control of the state. Similarly, proponents of the mass disruption thesis (see Piven and Cloward 1971) argue that social policies have improved because of the elite’s responses to protest by the poor and workers.

Welfare had to work with the grain of human nature. Self-interest, one of the most powerful of human instincts, had to be the cornerstone around which welfare reform was built.Welfare was not therefore seen as a neutral agency operating in society. Rather it was one, which, for good or ill, helps determine motivation, shape action and thereby determine character. The first generation of welfare state research was very much occupied with the question of why welfare states emerge, rather than why welfare states differ and how they differ. Instead of making explicit claims about what explains welfare state variations, the exercise was one of “devising laws” that could account for welfare state development and could be applied to a whole range of countries.

The resulting paralysis of both will and mind resulted in little concern for how different types of welfare (insurance or means-tested) affected behaviour; and to raise the question of fraud was to be automatically deemed politically unbalanced. 'Thinking the unthinkable' was the task for Labour's final years in opposition before 1997, and was part of the strategy of making Labour electable. It was never meant to be an activity undertaken in government. Pensions and unemployment benefits were made more generous in 1928 and in 1930. In 1931 unemployment benefit was cut by 10% but it was restored in 1934. Furthermore, prices continued to fall during the 1930s. By 1935 a man on the ‘dole’ was about as well off as a skilled worker in 1905, a measure of how much living standards had risen.United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. At www.unrisd.org, accessed Jul. 2009. Here UNRISD provides various research reports and conference news, working papers, and academic publications. Key research programs include social policy and development, democracy, governance and well-being, civil society and social movements, markets, business and regulation, identities, conflict and cohesion, as well as gender and development. This is an ideal core text for dedicated modules on the history of British social policy or the British welfare state - or a supplementary text for broader modules on modern British history or British political history - which may be offered at all levels of an undergraduate history, politics or sociology degree. In addition it is a crucial resource for students who may be studying the history of the British welfare state for the first time as part of a taught postgraduate degree in British history, politics or social policy. From 1911 workers in certain trades such as building and shipbuilding who frequently had periods of unemployment all contributed to a fund. If unemployed they could claim a small amount of money for a maximum of 15 weeks in any year. Again it was hardly generous but in 1920 the scheme was extended to most (not all) workers.